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THE ECONOMIC ROLE OF COMMODITY STORAGE
Brian D. Wright and Jeffrey C. Williams
Yale University

ABSTRACT

This paper presents a model of competitive, profit-maximizing storage
of a commodity with economically responsive, although stochastic, supply.
By comparing the distributions of market variables with and without storage,
we show that several intuitive notions about the role of storage are
misleading.

Rather than stabilizing production, storage actually accen-

tuates its variability.

Rather than being most effective at eliminating

short-falls in consumption, storage is more effective at reducing the incidence
of exceedingly high consumption.

Even so, a welfare analysis shows storage

is favorable to consumers over a wide range of demand specifications and
supply elasticities.

THE ECONOMIC ROLE OF COMMODITY STORAGE
Brian D. Wright and Jeffrey C. Williams
Yale University

One of the earliest, and most successful, examples of
economic policy is the oft-quoted Biblical account of Joseph's interpre
tation of the Pharoah's dream as implying that seven years of abundant
harvests would precede seven years of drought, and Joseph's recommendat ion
that the Pharoah should accumulate grain during the good years.

Since

that time the central role of storage in stabilizing the economy in the
face of exogenous disturbance s has been obvious, but our understandin g of
the nature of that role has not greatly advanced.
Without divine assistance in forecasting stochastic production, the
storage decision is considerabl y more complex than the one Joseph faced,
and the role of storage quite different.

In fact, several commonly held

impressions about the role of storage of commodities such as grains are
incorrect.

Rather than stabilizing production, storage actually accentuates

its variability .

Rather than causing a mean-price- preserving decrease or a

mean-outpu t-preserving decrease in the dispersion of price, storage generally
causes a more complex modificatio n of the distributio n of price.

Rather than

being most effective at eliminating short-falls in consumption , storage
actually is more effective at eliminating the incidence of exceedingly high
consumption .
In this paper we explore the role of storage in a model where produc
tion is stochastic and both production and storage are performed by competitive
profit-maxim izers who form rational expectation s about the returns to their
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activities.

We derive the subtle but very important interactions among·

production, price expectations, and storage, which simpler models cannot
capture.

Finally, we make a comparative statics assessment of the distri

butional implications of storage.

These results, while confirming the

importance of the specification of the demand function and the supply
elasticity identified in recent analytical studies (e.g. Wright (1979) and
Newbery and Stiglitz (1979)), are surprisingly favorable to consumers,
considering the asymmetric nature of the effects of storage on consumption
and price.
We start with a-closed competitive economy, in which all consumers are
assumed to be identical.

The inverse consumption demand for the single commo

dity in question is

(1)
where Pt is the price at time t and qt is the quantity consumed.
(2)

where St is the amount stored to period t + 1, and It is the amount on hand,
I

(3)

uhere x

t

t

as t- 1

is production in period t and a is the proportion of S

t- 1

available

at time t, after "shrinkage" or wastage of (1 - a)St_ •
1
Production in each period is subuect to a random disturbance.

Common

sources of production instability are likely to have multiplicative effects
on output, rather than the additive effects assumed in much of the literature
on storage and market stabilization.

In grain production for example, because

weather determines the yield of a particular acre, the more acres planted the
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Accordingly, the supply function is

greater will be the variation in total output.

+

(4)

V

t

]

where vt is the random production disturbance with a probability distribution
f(v) of finite variance.

The disturbance is assumed to be serially uncorre-

1
r
Pt is the producer incentive at
lated and is the same for each producer.
r
,.
time t - 1, when planned production, x (Pt), must be selected for time t.

Under this specification short-run (same period) production is perfectly
inelastic.
We assume that producers and all others in the model maximize profits
Both the structure of the

and have rational expections in the Muthian sense.

model and the distribution of vt are in the common information set nt-l
in period t-1.

Revenue of producer i when his realized production is x.1.t is

=

The producer maximizes expected profits
,.
(6)

where His total cost and E denotes the conditional expectation given r2 t- 1 •
Under atomistic competition, each producer is a price-taker, but he recognizes
the perfect correlation between the disturoance in his own production and
the disturbance in aggregate production.
competitive profit maximization is

(7)

oE[II. ]
1.t
,.

ax.l.t

=

Hence the first order condition for
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Thus a producer's incentive is the marginal return per unit of planned
r
production, Pt' where (remembering that he is a price-taker),

(8)

=

1 ..

The Competitive Profit-Haximizing Storage Rule
To complete the market model, we must consider the cost of storage,

which can be viewed as a productive activity transferring units of the
commodity available in period t to units available in period t + 1.
The cost of storing St units in period tis
(9)

=

where ~(St) is the net cost of physical storage services, (1 - a) is the
shrinkage factor, that is, the physical depreciation of the stored commodity,
and r is the interest rate.

Both a and rare, for simplicity, assmned

constant over time, with r >

0

are expressed in real terms.

For commodities such as grains, empirical

and

O < a< 1.

All prices and costs

evidence indicates that marginal physical storage costs are fairly constant
over the relevant range (Paul 1970).

Ac.cordingly, we specify physical

storage costs in (9) as

(10)

k >

0
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Empirical research on the "price of storage" relating grain stocks at
the end of the crop year to the difference between the nearest futures price
and the spot price shows that the net cost of storage includes an offsetting
accessibility value or "convenience yieldu to users which makes the net
(See Working (1949),

marginal cost of storage negative at low levels of S.
Brennan (1958), or Telser (1958).)

This accessibility value, which is related

to stochastic elements in distribution and demand, is discussed elsewhere at
Here we assume away any

length by one of the authors (Williams 1980).

accessibility value of stocks, and focus on the role of storage in mitigating
2
the effects of aggregate production disturbances.
Private storage, like production, is assumed to be a competitive_ profit
maximizing activity.

Given current inventory i 0

,

and conditional on storage

of ST in some future year T, the optimal storage in the current period is
the solution to a stochastic dynamic programming problem, in the tradition of
Gustafson (1958a and b).

(See also Johnson and Summer (1976), Newbery and

Stiglitz (forthcoming).)

As Samuelson (1971) shows, given an individualistic

social welfare function and appropriate regularity and transversality
3
· · ·
· ·
s t orage,
we lf are-maximizing
con d itions,

·
s*t' in

t d economy
. t ore
an un d is

with infinite horizon is a function of the amount available,

0 -s

(11)

and the Kuhn-Tucker necessary conditions are
(12)

0

<

0

=

(1 + r)

-1

a EPt+l - (Pt+ k)

f'

<

1
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These conditions can be reinterpreted as the following competitive profit
maximizing arbitrage condition:

Profit-maximizing competitive storage, if

positive, will equate current period price with expected price in the next
period, less the marginal cost of storage services, skrinkage, and interest
on capital invested.

The non-negativity of storage means that there is a fundamental
discontinuity in the storage rule.

Although it is possible to store for

the future, it is physically impossible to borrow from the future.

This

asymmetry has crucial implications for the effect of storage on consumption and

price.
2.

4

The Effects of Storage on Market Demand
The rule for profit-maximizing storage depends upon the particular

specifications of supply and consumption demand, as well as on the degree
of shrinkage, the cost of storage services, and the interest rate.

To allow for

examination of a wide range of specifications of the consumption demand func
tion, the following general form is used:

(13)

p

= a

+ Bq 1-C

This form includes the linear (a> O, C =
elasticity (a = O, B > O, C >

, a

>

O, 6

~

0

O) and constant

1) as special cases.

In what follows,

the relative curvature of a given demand curve is measured by C, which is
the Pratt-Arrow measure of curvature used to assess-relative risk aversion:

(14)

C

9P" (g)
p I (q)
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If C is greater than 2.0, the demand curve displays "commodity risk aversion",
because consumers would nay for a mean-preservinR decreaRe of the dispersion in
price.

If C is less than 2.0, the demand curve has commodity risk preference.
Derivation of the optimal storage rule in this model is analy

tically intractible.

Fortunately profit-maximizing storage rules

can be derived numerically using a process of successive approximation
described in the Appendix.

The storage function illustrated in Figure 1

was derived using this numerical method.

It represents the case where the

5
elasticity of demand nD is -0.2, the elasticity of supply n is 0, the

interest rate is 0.05, and supply in the absence of ·the stochastic
disturbance (i.e. at v

t

= 0) is 100.

The distribution of the multiplicative

disturbance is a normal density function with a mean of zero and a standard
deviation of 0.05.
assumed to be zero.

Physical storage costs are set at zero, and skrinkage is
Notice that when a quantity less than an amount I (equal to

99.09 in this example) is on hand, from current output and previous storage,
all of the available commodity is consumed.
between current consumption and storage.

Any excess above I is divided

The marginal propensity to store

-

chan8es only slowly over a large range of I, for I> I .

This is characteristic

of the storage functions derived for a wide range of sets of parameters.

5

In the example behind the storage function illustrated, because mean production and
consumption are 100, and mean storage is 3.4, mean availability is close to 103.4.
Under profit-maximizing storage, current price can be expressed as
function of the amount in store.

Using equation (1), the inverse consumption

demand function, and equations (2) and (11),

(15)

=

8

This expression is the inverse demand function for storage.

More precisely,

it is the inverse derived demand for the input of the commodity into the
storage process; accordingly, it is a function of the costs of the other
inputs into that process, including the costs of shrinkage, storage
services, and capital.

The derived demand for storage corresponding to the

-

stnrape function in Fi~ure 1 rnP.etR the _nrice axis at P = 104.7.

Yhen current

price exceeds P, expected future price net of all storage costs is less than
current price, so that there is no profit in even the first unit of storage.
Horizontal addition of the storage demand function to the consumption
demand function yields the market demand function shown in Figure 2.
P the elasticity of market demand changes from 0.20 to 0.48.

At price

This augmentation

of consumption demand below P by the storage demand function may explain the
(admittedly tentative) conclusion of Hillman, Johnson, and Gray (1975) that the
demand curve for corn is highly nonlinear, being much less elastic at high
prices than at lower prices.

Their measurements, relating price changes to

changes -in availability rather than in consumption, may reflect the demand
for storage, rather than any nonlinearity in the underlying consumption
demand curve.

This distinction is important, since, as we show below,

the welfare effects of stabilization are crucially dependent on the curvature
of the consumption demand curve, not of the market demand curve.

The

failure of Hillman et al. to draw this distinction is shared by several studies
of price stabilization that quote their conclusion, including Reutlinger (1976)
and Just et al. (1978).
3. The Effects of Storage with Zero Supply Elasticity.
As observed above, a rule·for optimal storage has the property that
below some level of availability I, no storage is carried over from one pro
duction period to the next.

Above I, consumption and storage generally both

increase as I increases, and the marginal propensity to store also rises.

9

These simple qualities of the storage rule actually have strong
implication s for the effects of storage.

To show this, we used the

example beqind the storage rule illustrated above, with constant elasticity
S
D
of demand n = - 0.2 (C = 6), and elasticity of supply n = O.O. Starting
with nothing in store, we applied the storage rule in a simulation of 10,004
periods, drawing from the random distributio n of the production disturbance ,
and saved all market data beyond the fourth period.

(For a sample of this size,

the distributio ns of the variables of interest should closely follow, the
population distributio ns.)
The distribution of storage is shown in Figure 3.

It is clearly

No storage occurs 24.4% of the time.

bi-modal and highly skewed.

Mean

(Sample means and standard

storage is 3.4 and th~ standard deviation is 3.5.

deviations for the distribution s discussed in this and the following sections
are displayed in Table,l.)

We also simulated the same number of periods

with the identical string of random numbers holding storage at zero.

A compa

rison of these two simulations provides an instructive illustratio n of the
effects of storage on market variables.
3.1

Effects of Storage on Price
Storage causes a large, asymmetric and possibly counter-int uitive change

in the distributio n of price.
is shown in Figure 4.

The distributio n of price in the absence of storage

Although the production disturbance is symmetric, the

distributio n of price is not, because of the nonlinearity in the constant
elasticity demand curve.

Figure 5 shows the distribution of price for the

same production sequence when storage is possible.

A comparison of the

distributio ns in Figure 4 and Figure 5 indicates that first of all, storage
lowers the mean price, in this example by 2.4%.

Because the mean of the

distributio n changes, the total effect of storage is not a mean-price- preserving

r
I,
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decrease in the dispersion of price, in the terminology of Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1970 and 1971).
To isolate the changes in dispersion from this change in the mean,
we shifted the distribution in Figure 5 by the difference in the mean price
and subtracted the densities in Figure 4 from those in Figure 5 to obtain
Figure 6.

With the help of Figure 6, we can see that storage affects price

dispersion mainly by shifting probability mass from the lower tail towards
the mean.

Thus the effects of storage on the price distribution are asymetric

in a fashion that contradicts popular notions about storage.

We tend to

think of storage primarily as protection of consumers against commodity
shortages and high prices.

But the type of storage considered here is much

more dependable in precluding coiliillodity gluts and low prices.

The greater

the inconvenience to consumers of a shortage (reflected in the demand curve)
the higher will be expected price and the larger the incentive to store.
Even so, optimal storage will not be large enough to ensure that there will
never be a shortage.

Indeed as Townsend (1977) has shown, any finite store

will be emptied with probability one in finite time.
3.2

Effects of Storage on Consumption
Because the elasticity of supply is zero in this example, storage

does not affect average consumption.
same distribution as production.

Without storage, consumption has the

Under perfectly inelastic supply, storage

causes a large mean-preserving decrease in the dispersion of consumption.
In the sample of 10,000 periods, storage reduces the standard deviation
of consumption from 5.0 to 3.0; by that measure it goes forty percent of
the distance to complete stabilization.

But this decrease in dispersion is

11

clearly asymmetric, as the resulting distribution is significantly skewed to
the left.

Figure 7 shows the difference between the frequency of consumption

with and without storage.

4.

The Implications of Responsive Supply

4.1

Effects of Storage on Planned Production
Once storage is introduced in the model, the assumption of perfectly

inelastic supply becomes a very important restriction.
storage, the elasticity of supply is in fact irrelevant.

In the absence of
Because there is no

serial correlation in the production disturbances, a shortage or glut in one
season has no effect on price in the next.

r

Hence Pt, the economic incentive

for production in year t as of year t - 1, when production must be planned, is
constant from year to year.

r
Storage effects the production incentive, Pt, in a given period in two
ways.

First, for a given current output of the commodity, the demand for

current storage increases price by augmenting the consumer demand curve as
shown previously in Figure 2.

Second, for a given output, any carryover from

the previous year depresses the realized price.

The relative strength of

these two effects on the incentive to produce varies from period to period,

r
so that Pt is sometimes higher, sometimes lower than it would be without
.storage. 'This interaction of storage and production is quite important to the
effects of storage, a fact missed by other models in the tradition of Gustafson
6

(1958a and b) in which elasticity of supply is fixed at zero.

We illustrate

r
the net result of storage on Pt using the previous example modified so that

supply elasticity n

s

is constant at 1.0 and supply is linear within the observed

range of planned production.
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Under responsive supply, the marginal propensity to store is greater
than in the storage rule illustrated in Figure 1 for n
of availability at which storage begins, I, is larger.

s

= O.O, and the level

Although storage is

generally thought of as a market-stabilizing mechanism, it clearly destabilizes
planned production, as can be seen in the distribution of planned production
under storage as shown in Figure 8.

In fact, the coefficient of variation of

planned production rises from 0% under completely inelastic supply to 41% of
that of realized production, which is in turn 10% higher than the coefficient
of variation of production without storage.

It is obvious that the derived

demands for production inputs (which are not explicitly considered here) are
also destabilized by storage.

Rather than being regarded as a means of

stabilizing production, competitive storage should be thought of as a way of
efficiently dispersing the effects of a disturbance thoughout an (undistorted)
economy.
In effect, storage acts as a substitute for production.

When current

supplies are abundant and the price of the commodity put into storage is low,
it is more economical to deliver supplies next period through storage rather
than through production.

On the other hand, if current supplies are expensive,

production is relatively more attractive.

When production is more responsive,

these two substitutes will each display greater variation, but their combined
action results in more stable consumption.
Besides increasing the dispersion of production, storage also
changes its mean, in this case by -0.4%.

The direction of this change

is related to the curvature of the demand curve, measured by the relative
commodity risk aversion parameter C.

As Table l shows, if the example is

changed so that C equals O.O, its value when demand is linear, while the
demand elasticity (at the equilibrium consumption in the nonstochastic case)
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remains -0.2, storage increases mean planned production when n

s

= 1.

For

demand curves with intermediate values of C, but the same elasticity, the

s

direction of change of mean planned production when n = 1 depends on
the degree of stabilization of consumption effected by storage, which is
7

itself a function of the cost of storage.

The contribution of responsive production to this process, however,
is asymmetric.

Maximum planned production, at 102.3, is the level of planned

production whenever storage is zero, which occurs in 27.9% of all years.
Therefore responsive production is poor insurance against a run of particularlv
bad harvests, since it provides a maximum offsetting increase in expected
availability of only 2.3%.

Production response is much more flexible in

compensating for abnormally good years; minimum planned production in the
sample is 9.2% below the mean.

This may explain why Gustafson (1958b) indicates

observed yields per acre of field crops are significantly skewed to the left,
while Day (1965) concludes yields in controlled experiments are skewed to the
right if at all.

Through its effects on economic incentives, storage may alter

realized production asymmetrically not only through acres planted but through
yields.
4.2

Effects of Responsive Supply on Storage, Price, and Consumption
Responsive supply greatly accentuates the effects of storage on price

and consumption, though it scarcely changes the first two moments of the storage
distribution.

D
In the standard example, (n c -0.2, Cc 6) mean storage is higher

s= 1

by only 1.3% for n
unaltered.

s

relative ton= O, while the standard deviation is virtually

But under the more responsive supply the distribution is much less

skewed, and the maximum amount in store in the sample is reduced from 24.8 to
20.3.

Reductions in planned production moderate the build-up of storage in a

string of good years.
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The existence of responsive supply greatly enhances the decrease
in the price dispersion caused by storage.

The coefficient of variation is

lower by 22.4% compared to the case illustrated in Figure 5.

The distribution

is much more highly skewed and minimum price is more than doubled in this
sample.
The dramatic effect of responsive supply on the dispersion of consumption under storage is shown 1·n Fi·gure 9.

·
Th e c 1us t ering
e ff ecte db y storage

is greatly accentuated by a transfer of probability mass from areas both
above and below the mean, reducing the coefficient of variation by 24%.
The difference in mean consumption.is negligible, but the new distribution
is much more skewed and has much higher kurtosis.

The most striking

effect is that maximum consumption in the sample is reduced by 12.5%, even
though maximum production is actually increased.

Maximum consumption is

in fact only a miniscule 0.35% higher than maximum planned production, which
occurs whenever storage is zero.
The effect of responsive supply on maximum consumption can be explained
as follows.

When supply is perfectly inelastic, very high consumption levels

occur after consecutive years of very high production.

When supply is

elastic, planned produ~tion is reduced after a good year, and profit
maxirnizinp, storage is increased; the net effact is a lower level of consumption
in the current year and the next, relative to the situation with fixed long
run supply.

The same kind of compensation does not occur in a string of very

bad years, however, because below the level of availability at which storage

r

is zero, further marginal shortfalls do not increase the price incentive P.
This explains why minimum consumption in the sample is higher by only 0.7%
under elastic supply, even though maximum consumption is so drastically reduced.
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6.

The Relevance of Demand Specification
Both the slope and curvature of the demand curve affect storage

behavior.

The less steep-is the demand curve, the lower is average storage,

and the less frequent is the occurrence of storage. For example, line 5 of
S
D
Table 1 shows that at n = -0.5, C = 6, and n = O, mean storage is 1.12
S
D
(compared to 3.4 for n = -0.2, C = 6, n = O), storage occurs 49.0% of the time
(compared to 75.6%) and the standard deviation of consumption is reduced by only
21% (compared to 40%).

Indeed, further examples would show that for demand

elasticities above unity the effects of storage are ne~ligihle •
. The effects of demand curvature, measured by C, the degree of "relative
commodity risk aversion," can be inferred from the cases summarized in Table 1.
The higher risk aversion at C = 6 is reflected in somewhat higher storage and
lower variance of consumption. _But the dispersion of prices is greater for
Although the magnitudes of these

C = 6, whether or not storage is possible.

effects of demand curvature are not very great, the distributional implications
are very important, as we shall now show.
7.

The Distributional Effects of Storage
So far we have considered the effects of storage on prices and

quantities.

Many studies of storage consider nothing else.

But the

ultimate interest of the results depicted in the figures and in Table 1 lies
in their implications for human welfare.

There is a large analytical

literature in the tradition of Waugh (1944), Oi (1964), and Massell (1969)
which attempts to model the welfare effects of storage as a symmetric reduction
in the dispersion of the production disturbance, implicitly or explicitly
assuming away the non-negativity constraint on storage, which, as noted above,
makes the problem analytically intractable.

(See Turnovsky (1978) for a survey
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of this literature on stabilization.
8

Stiglitz (1979) and Wright (1979).)

More recent work includes Newbery and
Because storage is much more reliable at

eliminating gluts than in alleviating shortages, it might seem likely that
the share of the allocative benefits accruing to consumers might be significantly
lower than under the symmetric reduction in the dispersion of consumption
effected by ideal stabilization.

Further, from Table 1 one might guess

that storage favors consumers most when it lowers consumption variance the
most (line 4), or when it lowers price variance the most (line 2).

In fact none

of these deductions from the information presented thus far is correct.
To assess the comparative statics distributional implications of storage,
we measured the mean changes in the present value of producer rents at the
time of harvest (denoted by the shorthand term "land value") and the mean
9

changes in present value of consumer surplus.

To make these measures meaning-

ful, we expressed them as percentages of a common base, the expected annual
value of production in a market without storage.

This base was preferred to

land value without storage, because land value is dependent on the specification
of the entire supply function from zero to maximum production, that is, well
10
beyond the relevant range here.
The results for eight cases are presented in Table 2.

It is immediately

clear that the distributional effects are heavily dependent on the three para

c, n° , an:! n5 • The direction of the effects depend largely on C. Consider
s
first the cases where n = 0. Under linear demand (C = 0) in which consumers

meters

are commodity risk-preferring, storage favors land holders at the expense of
consumers, but under constant elasticity of demand (C = 6), in which consumers
are cotm:n0dity risk averse, the reverse is true.

In the intermediate case

(C = 1.95, which approximates the hyperbolic demand specification
(P =a+ b

q-l) in which consumers are commodity risk-neutral, storage has

only a minor distributional impact.
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If n

s

= 1, storage always increases the expected welfare of consumers

in Table 2, even if they are commodity-risk-preferr ing (C = 0).

It is also

evident that responsive production greatly moderates the distributional
impact of storage.

Therefore, the assumption in most previous studies of

8
either n = 0 or an "irrational" response (e.g., adaptive expectations) in supply
may result in misleading distributional inferences.

Note also that respon-

sive supply increases the sum of the changes in the expected present value of
producer and consumer surplus so that, as the adverse distributional effects
. decline, the increase in net welfare is greater.

The case in line 2 of Table 2

in which the reduction in the standard deviation of price is greatest (see
Table 1) actually has the greatest net increase in welfa~e (in the comparative
statics sense), but certainly does not confer the greatest benefit on consumers,
as intuition might suggest.

Two other perhaps counter-intuitive results are

that the net gains are largest in the case when consumers have commodity risk
preference, and that the reduction in the variance of consumption is not greatest
when the net gains are largest.
Lines 7 and 8 in Table 2 show that storage has much less significance to
welfare at higher elasticities of demand, in line with the less pronounced
D
for n = -0.5 in Table 1. At the
h
e ffects on pri ce and consumpt i on sown
higher elasticity of demand, consumers can more easily substitute other goods
for the commodity in question during a shortage, so storage is of less
importance.11
The second and fourth columns of Table 2 display the differential
effects of ideal stabilization, that is, the complete absence of the production
disturbance itself.

Even though the storage modeled here has a very low cost

(an interest rate of 5 percent being the only carrying charge) ideal stabi
lization has much greater distributional effects and net benefits.

Furthermore,

18

lines 3 and 4 indicate that the sign of the effect on land value reverses
at a higher value of C under ideal stabilizatio n than under storage, so that
over a certain range, ideal stabilizatio n has an effect opposite to that of
storage.

In both storage and ideal stabilizatio n, the distributiv e effects

are almost linearly related to

c.

The most noteworthy lesson to be drawn from Table 2 is that the
asymmetric effects of storage, emphasized in previous sections, do not result
in a greater share of the allocative benefits accruing to producers.

Ralative

to the net gain, the differentia l gain to consumers is even greater under
storage than under ideal stabilizatio n; except in line 1.

The explanation lies

in the incompleten ess of the stabilizatio n effected by storage.

Small

symmetric reductions in variance always favor consumers for C > 1, even
though larger reductions may favor producers.12 Given C, the total distributive outcome depends on the extent of storage, which is a function of the
cost of storage~ the consumer demand elasticity, and the supply elasticity.
Conclusion

Competitive storage of commodities that are subject to stochastic
production disturbance s is much more effective in eliminating excessive levels
of consumption and low prices than in preventing low levels of consumption
and high prices.

This asymmetry stems from the constraint that storage must

not be negative, and is greatly accentuated when producers, as well as storers,
respond to incentives with rational expectation s.

When this is the case, the

interaction between storage and responsive production is subtle and complex.
Responsive production generally has relatively little effect on mean storage,
and vice versa, so in this sense it is not clear whether the two activities
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are substitutes or complements.

Yet when combined, they stabilize consumption

and market price in a highly complementary way, even though storage destabilizes
planned and realized production.
The implications of storage for producers and consumers cannot be
directly inferred from its effects on the distribution of consumption or
price.

A numerical welfare analysis shows that when demand is relatively

inelastic the storage activity may have substantial effects on the expected
present value of consumer surplus and of producer surplus, effects that are
either positive or negative depending on the curvature of the demand curve
and the supply elasticity.

Given the asymmetric effects of storage on

consumption and price which would seem to favor producers, it is noteworthy
that the differential gains to consumers who are commodity risk averse are
more favorable, relative to the net social gain, than they are under the
symmetric elimination of the disturbance defined as ideal stabilization.

Al
APPENDIX
Solving for the Derived Demand for Storage

If there is an infinite horizon, the derived demand for storage
Therefore, if a storage rule, St= f(It),

is the same in all periods.

when applied, reproduces itself, the derived demand curve has been deduced.
In the computer program, the storage rule is found by using the relation
between EPt+l and St implicit in the necessary conditions for profit-maximizi ng
storage.
First a guess is made for a polynomial in St that approximates
Using the storage rule implied by this function
and the competitive arbitrage conditions, expected price is calculated for a
range of integer values of

s.

This calculation requires a determination of

the particular planned production consistent with that S because the amount
of production influences expected price.

This is accomplished by guessing a

...

· planned production x and calculating the various prices that occur with
particular outcomes of the random probability distribution around that planned
production.

(A discrete approximation to the normal density function is used,

with 80 possible values spanning four standard deviations each side of the
mean.)

The integer storage under consideration plus these random outcomes of

production provide a distribution of amounts available.

For each of these in

turn, the current storage rule is used to compute storage and consumption.
Expected price is calculated from the distribution of consumption osing the
r
The producer incentive price, Pt, is
inverse consumption demand function.
calculated along with expected price by weighting the price at particular
outcomes by the ratio of realized production to planned production.
P~,

If this

~-!hen applied in the supply function, would yield the guess for planned

A2

x has been found .
prod uctio n, x, a cons isten t set of S, E[Pt +l], and
A

If not, anoth er guess for xis made.
each of the integ er
Once the calcu latio n of E[Pt+ l] has been made for
omia l in stora ge by the
value s of St, expec ted price can be fitte d to a polyn
polyn omia l is used ). If
means of a least -qua res regre ssion (A fourt h-ord er
defin ed by the conve rgenc e
that polyn omia l has not chang ed sign ifica ntly (as
s of expec ted price at
crite rion) from the one used to gene rate the value
d curve has been found . If
vario us level s of stora ge, a stabl e stora ge deman
the previ ous guess , and the
not, the most recen tly fitte d polyn omia l repla ces
nues until the inco rrect
proce ss is repea ted. In effec t, this proce dure conti
initi al guess is no longe r of any signi fican ce.
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TABLE

EXAMPLES OF THE MARKET EFFECTS OF STORAGE
Sample Means
Production and
Consumption
Without Storage

Case
(C,n

D S b

,n )

C

a

Production and
Consumption
With Storage

Storage

Price

Price
Without
Storage

100.0

100.0

3.2

100.1

100.1

99.9

99.9

3.2

100.7

101.0

100.0

100.0

3.4

101.6

104.0

100.4

100.0

3.4

100.9

102.0

5. (6.0,-0.5,0.0)

100.0

100.0

1.1

101.1

101.6

6 • (6.0,-0.5,1.0)

100.3

100.1

1.4

100.7

100.9

1. (0.0,-0.2,0.0)
2. (0.0,-0.2,1.0)
3. (6.0,-0.2,0.0)
4. (6.0,-0.2,1.0)

C

d
d

Sam2le Standard Deviations
Case
D

(C, n

!

11 s)b
C

1. (0.0,-0.2,0.0)
C
2. (0.0,-0. 2, 1.0)
d
3. (6.0,-0.2,0.0)
d
4. (6.0 ,-0. 2,1.0)

a

Price
Production and
Wtthout
Planned
Consumption
Without Storage Production Production Consum2tion Storage Price Storage
25.1
15.3
3.5
3.1
5.0
o.o
5.0
25.1
11.9
3.4
2.4
5.5
2.1
5.0
27.3
17.9
3.5
3.0
5.0
o.o
5.0
5.0

2.2

5.5

2.3

3.5

13.8

26.7

5. (6.0,-0.5,0.0)

5.0

o.o

5.0

3.9

1.7

9 .. 2

10.9

6. (6.0,-0.5,1.0)

5.0

1.2

5.2

3.5

2.1

8.3

10. 7

Footnotes:

a.
b.

a string

of 10,004 periods, with the first four
discarded. The same sequence of random disturbances was used for each case.
D S
The symbols (C, n, n) denote the measure of demand curvature
P"
(= - q (q)/P' (q)), the elasticity of consumption demand, and the (one

The sample consists of

period lagged) elasticity of supply, respectively.
are measured at the point (100, 100).
c.

Linear demand curve.

d.

Constant elasticity demand curve.

Both elasticities

T2

TABLE

2

DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF STORAGE AND IDEAL STABILIZAT
ION
DIFFERENCE FROM SITUATION WITHOUT STORAGE
(Perc ent of expec ted annua l reven ue witho ut stora ge)a
Land Value s:
Stora~ ~
Ideal Stabi lizati on
Mean

Case D
(C, n , n S)b

Prese nt Value of Consumer Suq~l us:
Stora ~e
Ideal Stabi lizati on
Mean

1. (O.O, -0.2, O.O)c

12.2

24.7

-7.1

-12.4

2.~Q. O, -0.2, 1.0)c

2.2

4.1

4.2

8.6

3. (1.95 ,-0.2, 0.0)

-3.1

0.6

7.9

11.7

4.(1. 95,-0 .2,. 1.0).

-.6

0.1

6.6

12.2

5.(6. 0, -0.2, O.O)d

-33.6

-49.1

38.0

61.4

6.(6. 0, -0.2, 1.0)d

-5.8

-8.3

11.6

20.6

-8.0

-19.9

8.7

24.9

-3.4

-6.6

4.3

11.6

7.(6. 0,
8.(6. 0,

-o.s, o.o)
-o.s, 1.0)

Footn otes: a.
b.

c.
d.

The sampl e consi sts of a string of 10,00 4 perio ds, with
the first four
disca rded. The same seque nce of random distur bance s was
used for each case.
S
·
The symbols (C, nD, n)
denot e the measu re of demand curva ture
P"
•
(= -q (q)/P '(q)), the elast icity
of consu mptio n demand, and the (one
perio d lagge d) elast icity of suppl y, respe ctive ly. Both
elast icitie s
are measu red at the point (100,1 00).
Linea r demand curve .
Const ant elast icity demand curve .

Nl

FOOTNOTES

1.

The presence of additional individual disturbances uncorrelated

with aggregate production would not alter the results of this paper.
If we had included the accessibility value as a decreasing function

2.

of S,the storage rules derived below would have been bent upwards at the
left, to indicate higher levels of storage at low levels of availability.
The following conditions (Samuelson 1971),

3.

Lim (l+r)-T ST
T

➔

Cl)

=

Lim(l+r)
T

➔

-T

EPt =

0,

Cl)

rule out long-run speculative explosion of storage and expected price.
4.

If the net cost of storage included a sufficiently high premium

for accessibility at low levels of S, then some storage would always occur.
However, results obtained under such a specification confirm that such
essential "working stocks", being relatively small and unresponsive to
economic incentives, do not greatly alter the general inferences discussed
below because they play only a minor role in smoothing production.
5.

Qualitatively similar storage functions were derived in the

pioneering study of Gustafson (1958a).

A linear storage rule is derived

analytically in a starkly simplified model in Aiyagari, Eckstein, and
Eichenbaurn (1980).
6.

An exception is Gardner (1979) who allows for responsive supply

in a model with integer storage and additive disturbances in production.
S
D
7. For example, in the case where C = 1.95, n = -0.2, n = 1,
(not reported in Table 1) mean planned production is less under storage.
However, if the market is completely stabilized (i.e., if v is fixed at
zero), planned production is slightly higher than in a stochastic market

N2

without storage.
These studies, like this paper, take a comparative statics

8.

They do not consider the welfare implication s of the initial

approach.

Such dynamic effects

buildup of stocks upon the introductio n of storage.
are considered in Wright and Williams (1981).

Assuming an individuali stic social welfare function, the

9.

change in the area under the rmcompensat ed consumption demand curve is
an exact measure of the change in welfare, only if the marginal utility
of income is constant over the relevant range of price.
if

R

y

= n

This is true

over the range of prices considered where R is the coefficient of
y

relative risk aversion with respect to income, and
elasticity of demand.

n

is the income

This condition is fulfilled if, for example, R is

constant and the indirect utility function has the additively separable
form in each time period:
V = A(P)

+ F(Y)
y

where F(Y) is linear in in (Y) (in which case R = n
y

(risk neutral, n

=

O).

= 1) or in Y

More generally, the error involved in using

the Harshallian demand curve is small if the commodity in question has
a low share of the consumer budget or a low income elasticity of
demand (Willig (1976)).

Under these conditions, the measure of relative

commodity risk aversion, C, is at least approximate ly independent of R.
For producers and starers, we have assumed either that R = 0 or that they
behave in a risk-neutra l fashion because they have access to a competitive
capital market,and because the coefficient of variation of the land price is

N3

very small.

(The coefficient of variation of the land prices in the examples

in Table 2 is always below .03, assuming the land share is at least 0.3).
The relaxat-ion of the assumption of risk neutrality.with respect to income
is an obvious topic for further research.

The implications of risk

averse behavior on the part of producers is investigated in an analytical
model of price stabilization by Newbery and Stiglitz (1979).
In the 10,000 sample observations for the set of cases con

10.

sidered, planned production ranged from 2% above to about 8% below the
Since nonlinearities in

equilibrium output under ideal stabilization.

supply outside this range would have virtually no effect on the derivation
of the storage rule or on the calculation of changes in land value, we
have chosen a yardstick that does not impose an unnecessary restriction on
the supply function outside the relevant range.
Further simulations (not reported here) show that the effect
5
of storage on land value has a nonlinear relation to nD and n • This
11.

From Wright (1979, p. 1025,

can be shown analytically for ideal stabilization.

equation 36) the annual expected gain in producer surplus relative to P q
is approximated by

where lnD

I

is the absolute value of

Thus

D

n.

2.

a ( 1

=

-

C

-

2

)

N4

and

=

=

The numerical results for storage are qualitative ly similar.
show that marginal increases in

ln°1

They

s
or n moderate the positive or negative

effects of storage on producer surplus, the effect decreasing as the absolute
value of t~e elasticity in question increases.
12.

This can be shown using a simplified analytical model of storage.

8

The easiest cases to consider are those for which n = O.

Ignoring the

non-negativ ity constraint on S, and assuming a constant marginal propensity
to stores, 0

<

s

~

r

-

1, the rational producer incentive P

becomes, using

a second order approximati on to the inverse demand function evaluated at
mean consumption q,

Pr (s)

= E

{(l

+

v)[P(q)

+

vq(l

1
s)P' (q) + <2>

V

For any particular marginal propensity to store

2
2 -2
q (1 - s) P" (q)]

s

the difference

in mean producer surplus due to storage relative to expected revenue is
G(s) where
2

=

av

-D

n

s

2

[ C (-) -

2

•
s)

+

§]

5l

N5

The effect of a marginal increase in storage is given by

ac(s)
as

=

2
-aV
D
n

[ C (s - 1) + 1]

·Thus when there is no storage (s =O), the introduction of a small amount
of storage reduces producer surplus (and, since the net benefits are positive,
must favor consumers) if C >l,
in the neighborhood of s = 1.

Producers always gain from marginal storage

Bl
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